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I.
Theoretical foundations
1. “Whatever the social form of production, labourers and means of 
production always remain factors of it. But in a state of separation from each 
other either of these factors can be such only potentially. For production to 
go on at all they must unite. The specific manner in which this union is ac­
complished distinguishes the different economic epochs of the structure of 
society from one another” .1 Thus the crucial problem is the association of the 
workers and the means of production, i. e. “I t  is always the direct relation­
ship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers 
— a relation always naturally corresponding to a definite stage in the deve­
lopment of the methods of labour and thereby its social productivity — 
which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social 
structure. . . ”2
If  the relation between state property and state enterprise is made sub­
ject of a theoretical study, if the essence, the principal function of a state 
enterprise is explored, we have to set out from the combination of workers 
and the means of production, of work and property in the present phase of 
building socialism in Hungary. From this aspect a state enterprise is nothing 
else but an organization having as its purpose the 'peculiar combination of 
state socialist oumership and labour3. In general the peculiarity of this com­
bination has its origin in state ownership, specifically under the conditions 
of the present phase of building socialism, and particularly in the” innume­
rable different emprical circumstances, natural environment. . .  external his­
torical influences, etc.. . . ”4 which actually prevail in Hungary, i.e. the pecu­
liarities of building socialism in Hungary, the system of economic management 
introduced on January 1, 1968, first of all.
2. “Hätte die Revolution von 1789 stattgefunden ohne die heillose Iso­
lierung der französischen Bürger vom Gemeinwesen? ...D ies Gemeinwesen, 
von welchem ihn seine eigene Arbeit trennt, ist das Leben selbst, das physische 
und geistige Leben, die menschliche Sittlichkeit, die menschliche Tätigkeit, der 
menschliche Genuss, das menschliche Wesen. Das menschliche Wesen ist das 
wahre Gemeinwesen der Menschen” .5 “Würden z.B. bei der Entwicklung von 
Familie, bürgerlicher Gesellschaft, Staat etc. diese sozialen Existenzialwesen
des Menschen als Verwirklichung, Verobjektivierung seines Wesens betrach­
tet, so erscheinen Familie etc. als einem Subjekt inhärenter Qualitäten. Der 
Mensch bleibt immer das Wesen aller dieser Wesen, aber diese Wesen erschei­
nen auch als seine wirkliche AUgemenheit, daher auch als Gemeinsame” .6
Our second point of departure is this “true community.” (Gemeinwesen.) 
Following from the immanent social nature of man this community is always 
present notwithstanding its historical metamorphoses — in capitalism it is 
embodied by commodity relations — yet prior to communism it was only 
a “caricature” of true and real human community.7 The struggle for the com­
pletion of this community coincides with the struggle for communism. In the 
course of this struggle, Hungary has already taken the decisive step, i.e. the 
socialisation of the means of production and the liquidation of class antagonism. 
By this the basic conditions of the mentioned completion have been brought 
about, and the gate has been opened to a period of transition, which will turn 
up the pages of “the true history of mankind.” Thus the basic conditions have 
been created for the worker not being separated by his own work from the “true 
community” , although we are still at the beginning of this path: the funda­
mental possibility has been created for a development towards communism and 
the realisation of this possibility is the task and responsibility of society. In 
order to achieve this, the development of productive forces must transform 
work by freeing it from its often mechanical and physically excruciating, often 
mentally blunting character, which timits the capacity to comprehend the soci­
al-economic processes and social consciousness has tobe transformed by a high­
ly developed social-productive practice.
The struggle for the “true community” has a fundamental significance. 
An abandonment of this element either by seeing society only as a sum of 
individuals, or by associating decisive production, or even barter, with property 
directly, eliminating the social element, would emasculate this analysis and 
deprive it from its human-social element. In the first case, the dialectic of the 
“specific essence” (Gattungswesen) of man as individual and as social being 
would be ignored, in the second, economism would haunt us in a peculiar form. 
State socialist ownership, together with other forms of social ownership, is the 
basic condition — but only the basic condition — for the completion of a “true 
community” in the present phase of evolution.
3. Naturally there are many methods applied in conjunction for the 
achievement of a “true community”, i. e. for developing the free community 
of communism. Among these, one by no means insignificant method is the 
development of group communities for serving as a link between the indi­
vidual and society. Although society as a whole is always present in the inter­
course of individuals in one form or another, it is the group that can unite in a 
concentrated form the social and individual elements. In the group the features 
of each individual still stand out distinctly, but society as a whole already be­
comes visible more clearly. Through the agency of group interests, the group 
may embrace the individual interests of its members, and social interest at the 
same time. Not as if individuals could not carry social interest, but in the present 
phase of our evolution social interest may often appear to the individual in a 
rather abstract, distant, often unknown form. And in the present state of 
social consciousness, intense, dominant energies for a consistent and absolute 
service of social interest frequently fail to develop in the individual. However,
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partly the members of the group may be thoroughly familiar with group interests, 
partly intensive, individually charged impulses may be generated for the service 
of group interest at a time when group interest and group efforts may become 
aligned for the service of social interests more conveniently than the often 
divergent interests and efforts of millions of atomized individuals.8 Hence the 
group is the concentrated link between individual and all-social functions. 
Therefore this function qualifies the group for becoming the architect of the 
“true community”. In fact an essential path to the development of true all­
social collectives is the building up and development of group collectives. That 
in the present phase of our development this takes place in a certain sense in a 
roundabout way, is another matter (section 35).
All that has been set forth so far is of vital importance for the present 
subject-matter merely because under modern conditions of production society 
displays productive activities overwhelmingly within the framework of group­
forming units. As a matter of fact modern productive forces insist on operative 
frameworks where groups differentiated by division of labour are active. 
Whether or not, as for their content, these groups constitute a pile or a com­
munity, what sort of a community as for that matter, depends on a number 
of factors. In the enforcement of the economic reform now in progress in Hun­
gary, a tendency pointing far beyond the sphere of economic management is to 
fill groups and group interests with a community content, and to reinforce 
their cohesion.9 This tendency is being realized by means which many do not 
consider as socialistic: i. e. by encouraging financial interested ness which serves 
group interests, manifesting themselves in profit, and serves in this way also 
social interests. Here we shall not discuss the obvious risks of this tendency; 
all we should like to point out is that the development of a group community 
for the achievement of a “true community” is served by means established in 
societies of the past, also incorporating disruptive trends, which means may, 
however, be freed from these trends, and may have a chance of acting to a 
varying degree until communism has been built up. This does not, however, 
take place in the spirit of the catchword “the end justifies the means”, but in 
agreement with the present stage of material and mental development of 
society. An objection may be raised only by those who would like to force 
their way to communism without men, on an abstract pattern, by ignoring the 
state of production and consciousness at any time.
Hence, with the nationalization of the means of production, the basic 
condition for the achievement of a “true community“ has been created. An 
important stage of the path still before us is the reform of economic manage­
ment, which by way of a large-scale development of group interested ness advan­
ces at great strides towards the formation of group interestedness uniting the 
social and individual elements in a concentrated form. The state enterprise is 
the most important organizational framework and stage of the formation of the 
group community alloying the social and individual elements
4. The potentialities of the formation of a group community exist only 
amidst the conditions of social ownership. Although, as has already been pointed 
out, the phenomenon of a “true community” is in one form or another present 
in the evolution of society as a whole, in fact man is always a social being, but 
under bourgeois conditions “true community” manifests itself in a form trans­
mitted by the commodity relations and consequently in an enfeebled form.
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Under bourgeois conditions the merger of ownership and work takes place 
through a mass of atomized exchanges of commodities among the members 
of antagonistically opposed classes. Bourgeois owners of enterprises assign the 
group of producers by way of commodity contracts to their means of production 
and by tliis bring about the class antagonism within the factory: the union of 
the owners of the factory and the element performing the work at the same time 
brings to light their disruption. E. g. in a company limited by shares there is a 
“dual collective”, viz. the owner group of the shareholders, to which the executi­
ves of the enterprise having decision-making competences are attached, and 
the group of manual and white collar workers of the lower ranks. However, 
this “dual collective” differs from Venediktov’s dual collective section 7) in so 
far as between the former collectives there is the ditch of class antagonism.10 
This, however, bears testimony to the fact that under the conditions of modern 
large-scale industry at a higher stageof generalization the notion of Venediktov’s 
dual collective has a significance transcending beyond the socialist enterprises. 
This notion may serve as a starting poiixt e. g. in disputes with opinions empha­
sizing the element of private ownership has disappeared from the background 
of the modern bourgeois enterprise, power being vested in the employed mana­
ger. In a modern bourgeois enterprise, too, a combination of ownership and work 
takes place. In contrast to the socialist solution, the specific traits are the class 
antagonism of the two; in contrast to earlier societies, the commodity nature of 
the combination; and in contrast to an earlier phase of capitalism, a moderate 
change in the actual functions of the owner, without a diminution of his power 
(section 10 and 27).
II
The combination of ownership and work in the 
European socialist countries
5. In the history of European socialist evolution, the combination of social 
ownership and the group collective of producers has taken place on the follo­
wing patterns.
a) The overwhelming role of state socialist ownership in a system which 
unites the state sector as a whole in a uniform organization of super- and subor­
dination, where the elements of administrative law are pi’edominan't, group­
forming and individual interests have no appreciable significance; enterprises 
in either the economic or legal sense need hardly be considered here, and civil 
law solutions have a wholly subordinate role. This was the system of „war com­
munism.”
b) The other extreme is the complete denial of state socialist ownership, 
the wholesale identification of ownership and group in the national economy as 
a whole (and not only in the co-operative sector). Here the all-social element 
finds no direct expression of ownership; group-ownership is the sole intermedi­
ary between social property and labour: the owner is the producing collective. 
Consequently the state administers the property of groups alien to it, and not 
its own property. This is the Yugoslav system.
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c) The third pattern resorts to the intermediation of both the state-and 
the group-ownership. The producing groups are in the first place united with 
the means of production in state ownership in a way that within the framework 
of the state enterprise the relative independence of the group is established with 
lesser or greater intensity without ownership. This is complemented by the in­
termediation of group (cooperative) ownership. This method became establi­
shed with different centres of gravity and in different proportions in the earlier 
and new systems of economic management in the socialist countries of Europe, 
and so also in the Soviet Union following war communism, i. e. primarily 
in the last years of the twenties, as well as in Yugoslavia in the beginning.
6. There is not much left to be said of the model of war communism. I t  was 
born amidst wholly specific, unfavourable conditions. An originally weak country 
ravaged by war, with a starving population, carrying on a struggle for life with 
the armies of imperialism and the domestic foe, with an industry of a low poten­
tial, and therefore easier to centralize, a small number of trustworthy profes­
sionals and experts, who therefore had to be employed preferably at head­
quarters, these were the basic factors which helped to shape war communism. 
I t was a makeshift in the strictest sense of the word.
The Yugoslav pattern owes its birth to the horror from the bureaucratic 
traits of the state sector. I t was not believed that these traits could be cropped 
to a minimum and therefore the bureaucratism of the state sector was jettiso­
ned together with the state sector, i. e. state ownership was abolished. Without 
going into details here, it is submitted that the abolition of state ownership, the 
exclusiveness of social group property preserves one of the characteristics of 
bourgeois private property, at least in its tendencies, viz. the risk of anarchy 
without, however, a risk of exploitation. Here group interests can be integrated 
into social interests with difficulties only. Notwithstanding the stage of deve­
lopment transcending the group limits of the productive forces, the full exploita­
tion of these forces, their proportionate development have become problema­
tic. Here the intensity of the all-social element is wanting, and there is a risk 
that the group interests integrating the individual interests are integrated 
with the all-social interest insufficiently and with difficulty. At the present 
stage of production and consciousness, risks of this type appear to be implied 
in the seemingly most highly developed pattern of a socialist solution, where 
the ownership of the means of production is given directly to the producing col­
lective, thus abolishing the segregation and union of ownership and work.
The pattern “state enterprise”, is distinguished fromthat of war commu­
nism by the term “enterprise”, and from the Yugoslav pattern by the epithet 
“state”. This, on the one hand, does not consider the state sector a single huge 
organization, and, on the other, does not break down social property to purely 
group properties. Therefore here a risk of either bureaucracy, or, at the other 
extreme, of anarchic tendencies is undoubtedly implied. This follows from the 
circumstance that this pattern unites the two extremes; the one mitigates 
the risks of the other, yet never removes them once for all. Still on the other 
hand this pattern also incorporates all the advantages of the two extremes, viz. 
the right of disposal over the totality of the productive forces as well as the 
exploitation of individual and group interestedness, when the one reinforces 
the other, are equally possible in this pattern. In the earlier system of econo­
mic management, the former was more in prominence; whereas in the new sys-
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tem the risk implied in the latter is more imminent. In the present phase of 
evolution in Hungary, this pattern appears to be relatively the most suitable : 
it merges the property of society as a whole represented by the state with 
the producing group endowed with more or less independence. This system, at 
least in principle, guarantees the best possible reconciliation of all-social 
and individual interests through the link of the group.
The following discussion will move within the framework of this latter 
pattern.
I l l
The foundations of the Hungarian system
7. On the basis of what has been set forth so far, the thesis chosen as star­
ting point can be expanded in a sense that the state enterprise may he considered 
the organizational framework of the coupling of state socialist ownership and the 
producing group. I t  is undoubtedly the merit of A. V. Venediktov that he had 
exposed his theory of a dual collective11, giving good expression to this basic 
structure, at a time when what this theory implied was a potentiality rather than 
a reality. This theory served as a guidance of legal policy and jurisprudence12 
for a tong time, even when some of the statements going into detail cannot any­
more stand the test. As a matter of fact the duality of the all-social collective 
and of the enterprisal collective exactly represents the coupling of state socialist 
ownership and the producing group. I t would be a mistake to interpret this 
coupling of the two as if the owner were outside the enterprise, whereas the 
collective is inside it. The owner and the working elements are separated 
relatively within the enterprise proper. The collective of the latter is building 
up, and becoming institutional by degrees. Within the enterprise, interestedness 
and jurisdiction of the owner and the producing collective are separated, and 
in the wake of the economic reform, substantial changes take place in the 
proportions, which in turn have entailed an increase of the interest of the wor­
kers as members of the collective.
8. Hence the owner element is present both within the enterprise and 
outside it. Outside the enterprise it is embodied by the economic guiding agen­
cies, and within it by the manager appointed by these agencies. The reform of 
economic management has introduced considerable changes in the relations 
between external and internal proprietary guidance and management. The 
nature of external proprietary management has changed, and consequently 
internal proprietary management has become more a reality than before. As is 
known this change has been effected in a way that the system of direct instruc­
tions has been superseded by a system of indirect economic regulators constitut­
ing part of the economic plan. This change of system has placed the enterprises 
in an economic environment where their legally free decisions made in response 
to the impulses of a state-controlled market in general conform to all-social 
interests. In order that the stimuli directed to making decisions of this type in 
fact provoke a vigorous response in general, and should be reflecting all-social 
interest, the “enterprisal” and “collective” interestedness attached to the profit 
had to be established with sufficient power, and in a way that the enforcement
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of all-social interests should have priority. In order that the enterprises might 
in fact reach efficient decisions, adequately extensive competences had to be 
vested in them.
Hence, on the whole, the following picture will present itself:
a) The external environment (the controlled, but, of course, never wholly 
controllable market) provides the stimuli. As far as possible the state will bring 
about this economic environment, not in a proprietary capacity, but in the 
course of its economic organizing work comprising the national economy as a 
whole. The tools are primarily unique large investments by the state, and, 
secondly, other investments and the various economic regulators decreed by the 
state, i. e. regulators governing the price, wage, taxation, credit and currency 
policy. Since these regulators do not affect the problem of state ownership, we 
shall not discuss them here.
b) The internal construction of the enterprise, its economic infrastructure 
and the enterprisal and collective competencies have to guarantee that the 
enterprise respond to external stimuli in a lively and correct manner. The 
enterprise has to make the decisions and both the enterprise and the collective 
will have to bear consequences intensely. The state as owner has to take care 
of this. Therefore in the following we shall speak of this economic and legal 
arrangement.
9. The owner is the state, and creates an enterprise in order to couple state- 
owned means of production with labour. In this connexion the agenda of out­
standing importance is this:
a) decision on the foundation, reorganization, or liquidation of an enter­
prise;
b) placing at disposal the starting capital;
c) definition of the scope of activities of the enterprise;
d) appointment and dismissal of the manager.
These four decisions are the criteria and the necessary minimum of ow­
nership, independent of the social systems.13 These are the basic functions 
also when a joint stock company is floated. Ignoring discrepancies in the con­
tents for the present, there remain the differences in the legal structure. The 
decision of the state as owner assumes forms of administrative law in the ma­
jority of cases. In fact, the unity and at the same time the discrepancies, of the 
sovereign and proprietary character of the state have been explored already by 
Venediktov.14 Naturally, a sharp separation of the two characters is out of the 
question. However, obviously the basic forms of movement of the state on the 
legal level consist in sovereign and administrative acts. Consequently, as for 
the content, on the whole yet not completely, the proprietary and the sovereign 
elements are separable, but not on the level of the legal forms. The state may 
continue its proprietary activities by having recourse to the means of adminis­
trative law, and, for that matter, within a definite scope, it may make use of its 
proprietorship also for the continuation of administrative activities 15. This 
goes to an extent that it will become a matter of decision purely in the field of 
economic policy whether the state will appropriate what is its due as proprietor, 
in the form of profits, or as holder of the sovereign power in the form of a profit 
tax (section 16). In addition, the state has recourse to means of labour law. it 
signs a labour contract with the manager. Furthermore the state makes use 
of means of civil law, e. g. when it remits the starting assets to the account of
S T A T E  P R O P E R T Y  — S T A T E  E N T E R P R IS E  4 3
the enterprise. By contrast, the decisions of an enterprise-founding capitalist 
owner cannot assume the form of administrative acts. Here for the foundation 
of an enterprise the founders resort to means of civil law or commercial law, and 
do so also in their associated banking operations. Here, too, elements of labour 
law will emerge.
10. To what extent the owner may thereafter have a say in the operations 
of the enterprise, will be a matter of deliberations following from the proprietary 
position, rather than a problem of ownership proper. The extreme indepen­
dence the owner grants to his enterprise is a phenomenon of modern large- 
scale industry, basically independent of the antagonistic character of the social 
systems. The contrast between the socialist state, directing planned econo­
my as owner, and the capitalist owner is not discussed here. The owner 
entrusts the transaction of business to the manager. He himself will merely 
keep a check on the extent to which the manager has achieved the targets the 
owner had set. If the operations of the enterprise are up to the mark, he will 
express his satisfaction with gestures of contentedness and friendship; if not, 
he will become unfriendly, e. g. he will terminate employment, reorganize or 
wind up the enterprise.
In the earlier system of economic management this was the case to a small 
extent only. A discussion of the details why this was justified in the period follo­
wing the socialization of the means of production, at a time of a large-scale 
socialist “accumulation of capital”, will be omitted here. Still the fact remains 
that the situation has changed and — mutatis mutandis — this change is of an 
order of magnitude equalling that of the transition from the liberal phase 
to the monopolistic phase in the history of capitalism, even if the change is in 
the opposite direction. However, it should be remembered that in both capita­
lism and socialism the change has taken place within the framework of the 
existing basic structure.
The peculiarly non-proprietary economic structure of a state enterprise as 
shaped by the economic reform owes its existence to the fact that the specific 
objective and subjective circumstances which stood in the way of the enforcement 
of the general trend outlined above, have ceased to exist.
11. The structure of the enterprise and, in general, enterprisal operations, 
rely on the possible solidity of this arrangement. This solidity is guai-anteed by 
the starting assets together with the l'eserve fund to which the procedure of 
reorganization and liquidation is attached. This is guaranteed also by the 
relative stability of the economic i-egulatoi-s, a problem which is outside the 
scope of this study. Finally, it is also guaranteed by the prohibition to re­
shuffle enterprisal assets. Without a solidity of this sort, enterprisal indepen­
dence would be rendered practically nonexistent by the fluidity of the assets.
12. Another condition of enterprisal independence is the supply of the 
enterprise with current assets sufficient at least for simple re-production. 
To this the right of the enterprise to investments has to be added, i. e. the legal 
possibility of a decision to extend re-production. Still here the stringency of 
financial means required for investments calls for a certain all-social regulation, 
at least when the investments exceed a certain oi-der of magnitude. This all­
social regulation is guaranteed by the circumstance that an enterprise may 
invest from its own means only to a limited extent. Beyond a certain amount, 
the entei’prise has to apply for bank credits and by having l’ecourse to the
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principles of a credit policy, the bank may safeguard all-social interests. How­
ever, in order to prevent the enterprise from throwing itself completely on the 
bank beyond a definite limit, and to keep off the allurement of irresponsible in­
vestment, bank credits are granted for investment only when the enterprise at 
the same time ties down and risks its own means.
13. I t is the endeavour of the state to bring about a harmonic equilibrium 
between the means of production consolidated in its enterprises and the group 
performing work. The means of production cannot therefore be developed to 
the prejudice of the collective, nor can the group consume what is needed for 
the development of production. This is the reason why the state as owner has 
created the funds of enterprisal interestedness, namely the development and 
the profit share funds.16
The creation of these two funds has called attention to one of the significant 
traits of the system.
The enterprise, so far mostly considered a framework or an organization, 
is — for its content — the unity of property and work, of the means of production 
and the producing collective. Although the funds mentioned above are not 
responsible for this duality in unity, still they give expression to it, moreover 
provide it with definite outlines and enlarge this relative “other”-ness of pro­
perty and labour within this inseparable economic unity. Here it will become 
manifest that “in the present system of economic management the enterprise 
displays its activities in a dual capacity, viz. as economic venture and as the 
shop of collective work.”17 The enterprise is the relative duality of an eco­
nomic organization producing for needs and of a producing and consuming 
group of men. Here, so to say; the relative discrepancy between “enterprise” 
and the collective will manifest itself, and since enterprise and collective have to 
be supplied from a given, and by no means unlimited, mass of assets, also a 
relative conflict of interests will emerge18. This relative conflict of interests 
appears with clarity in the dispute whether the fees for innovators should be 
charged to the development (technical development) fund or to the profit share 
fund. In this segregation and relative conflict of interests, stress is laid separa­
tely on the financial and personal, on the proprietary and working elements of 
the enterprisal unity, and in this sense the group collective will appear relatively 
abstracted from the enterprise in the same way as the enterprise has been ab­
stracted relatively from the group collective. However, it should be remembered 
that the two abstractions are of an extremely relative character. In fact the 
enterprise is the economically inseparable unity of the means of production 
and the collective doing the work; within an enterprise, no collective exists 
without means of production, just as there are no means of production ivithout 
a collective. What may happen at most is that within an enterprise the “econo­
mic” aspects will be in the fore in certain respects rather than the “personal” , 
and vice versa. The fundamental unity of interests of the two sides is equally 
clear: the work of the group collective produces the “enterprisal” profit, and 
with the growth of the “enterprise” the incomes of the members of the collective 
will also tend to rise. As regards the relative conflict of interests, exactly the 
factor which lays a stress on, and gives prominence to, the duality of “enter­
prise” and collective, namely the separation of development and profit share 
funds, will prevent even the most comprehensive difference of interests from 
degenerating into an open conflict. The question of the distribution of the
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profit left with the enterprise between the “enterprise” and the collective has 
been settled from the very outset by the provision which fixed the shares to be 
remitted to the one fund and to the other. And this regulation originates from 
the only competent agency, namely the owner.
IV
The element of management
14. As far as the “economic” or “enterprisal” element is concerned, in this 
respect we may speak of the commodity-owner functions of the state enterprise 
in the more comprehensive economic, but not in the legal sense19, however 
with certain limitations:
a) The function of a “commodity owner” is g partial function only. The 
statement, or final conclusion, according to which the state enterprise is “the 
narrower collective of the workers and employees, organized and directed by the 
state as the wider collective, whose specific function among the state agencies 
lies in the fact that through it the state appears as a commodity owner”20 
elevates — in this author’s opinion — an actually existing element to the rank 
of a par excellence specific function of the state enterprise. Previously already 
Venediktov saw the essence of the right of operative management in the orga­
nization and realization of production, i. e. in administrative, labour and civil 
law activities, and not exclusively in those of civil law21. In our opinion the 
specific function of a state enterprise among the state agencies is the combina­
tion of the means of production in state ownership with the groups performing 
work, i. e. in production or any other economic activity, and — since commodi­
ties are being produced — two of its indispensable partial activities are purcha­
se and sale, both of which take place in a way that the state buys and sells, 
although the state is not the owner. However, the development and operation 
of a non-proprietary collective is a function of the state enterprise as well, in the 
same manner as its “business” activities, the earning and the increase of profits. 
The capacity of a “commodity owner” has a role only in this latter sphere, but 
does not exhaust this sphere fully. An enterprise has not only “commodity owner” 
functions, which it exercises outwards, but also decision-making competences as 
regards the augmentation of state-owned fixed assets, investment and technical 
development. Although eventually these functions and decision will similarly 
be translated into reality through the agency of contracts, i. e. by means of 
commodity relations, both the competence and the function in its background 
will go beyond “the sphere of commodity ownership existing to the outside, to 
third persons and their organizations“ i. e. a sphere which exists only in respect 
of assets entrusted to the management of the enterprise.22 Here the enterprise 
amplifies the means of production and the fixed assets in state ownership, and 
any decision the enterprise may make in this respect will exceed the “com­
modity owner” functions exercised outwards on the assets “entrusted to its 
management”. The functions of the economic, “business”, “enterprisal” struc­
ture of a state enterprise cannot be exhausted merely by activities turned out­
side, which are secondary if compared to the decision and activities directed
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to simple and expanded re-production; but one of the partial functions may be 
termed as the function of a “commodity owner.”
b) Yet this is not an achievement of the reform of economic management. 
A state enterprise was always, and still is, a Janus-faced institution; in a certain, 
though changed sense, it is within the organizational scope of the state, and an 
economic unit at the same time. The enterprise is the subject of relations of 
both administrative and civil law. Even in the earlier system of economic 
management, the enterprise exercised the rights of possession, use and dis­
posal, and exercises them even today. I t  was a juristic person, and it is still 
one. All this has been discussed extensively in the literature in the period of the 
earlier system of economic management, and even this author wrote, and was 
by no means the first to do so, that on the level of inter-enterprisal co-operation 
“state socialist ownership operates in the form of commodity ownership”.23 In 
this respect the reform has produced quantitative changes only in the process 
where the extremely detailed plan instructions have been superseded by fewer, 
comprehensive and obligatory plan figures and thereafter the system of obliga­
tory targets has come to an end. In this process the decision-making authority 
of the enterprises was moderate at the outset, and expanded gradually later on. 
When we modestly spoke only of the “commodity form”, the law of value acted 
notwithstanding the preponderance of the elements of distribution and often 
took vengeance without mercy on those who denied it. The elements of distribu­
tion were thrust to the background a long time before the reform, whereas the 
commodity elements now enjoying a growing legality became “useful citi­
zens”. This resulted in a profound change of the ratio of the two Janus faces, 
and the vertical (administrative) and internal (labour law, internal organiza­
tional) relations had undergone a change in the same way as the horizon­
tal (civil law) relations. As a matter of fact the change of the latter had its 
origins in the change of the vertical relations. The quality of a “commodity 
owner”, as it received permanent emphasis, in a sense tha t it was the enterprise’s 
due toward the outer world, belonged to this latter sphere. However, here the 
changes took place within the structures delimited earlier: the traditional 
rights of ownership, i. e. the rights of possession, use and disposal were exercised 
not by the state, but by the enterprise, and are exercised even today. In this 
sense the relation directed to the “outer world” has not changed, still the 
contrary is implied by the thesis that after the reform through the enterprise 
the state acts as“commodity owner.”
The qualitative changes brought about by the reform have taken place 
behind this façade of “commodity owner” turned to the “outside”. The rela­
tions between state and enterprise have changed decisively, and this change 
had repercussions on the earlier rights of possession, use and disposal (i. e. on 
the content of the quality of a “commodity owner”). After the reform, the 
enterprise cannot any more be considered the lowest executive and acting 
agency of state economic administration. Actually, there is an owner-like 
relationship between state and enterprise, and as has been said, as far as the 
legal forms are concerned, there are relations of administrative law in this 
sphere, or relations of administrative law of the same quality as those of the 
management of non-state property (official and such of general economic 
policy). Therefore the second part of the statement quoted earlier and valid also 
for the conditions of the reform of economic management, i. e. that the state
S T A T E  P R O P E R T Y  — S T A T E  E N T E R P R IS E  47
makes use not only of the traditional proprietary rights, but avails itself of a 
specific property-administration competence21, will not hold its own after the 
economic reform. As has been mentioned, the state decides merely on the 
existence and the fundamental scope of activities of the enterprise, provides for 
the subsistence of the enterprise, and attaches the manager by the force of 
labour law to the enterprise. The control activities of the state are of a mixed 
proprietary and general economic policy character. In the scope of every­
day administration, the state may make use of the remnants of the right 
of instruction now restricted to an extremely narrow sphere. I t  is quite natural 
that this decisive change has repercussions on the content of the “commodity 
owner” quality to a high degree. Moreover, Vildghy is right in so far as the 
decisive change which has taken place in the vertical relation has among others 
(mainly in addition to the development of a collective interestedness) been 
directed in the first place exactly to the realization of the “commodity owner” 
content. However, this does not alter the fact that
aa) the quality of a “commodity owner”, i. e. the rights of possession, use 
and disposal, and, in a varying manner its actual potentiality, existed even 
earlier;
bb) with the “commodity owner” function the specificity of a state enter­
prise cannot be exhausted, i. e. neither the “economic” aspect will be exhausted, 
nor the “personal” aspect covered.
15. The financial stability and independence of a state enterprise supersede 
the economic structure of independent accounting and the “operative manage­
rial right” relying on the former and manifesting itself on the level of law. 
This has been stated appropriately by Vildghy and others. From the economic 
point of view it is the “assets” rather than “accounting” that should be assigned 
to the epithet “independent”, and legally the stress is on “economic” or “busi­
ness activity” rather than on “operative management”. An essential element of 
“economic” or “business activity” is the activity of a “commodity owner”, i. e. 
the possession, use of state property and disposal of it. Of this trinity only the 
last member is of an expressly “commodity owner” nature.
Presumably the majority of opinions agree with the outworn nature of 
the terms “independent accounting” and “operative managerial rights” in Hun­
gary. Still not everybody agrees that the solution does not affect the basic 
structure of state ownership. The concept of “divided ownership'’ has turned up 
in Hungarian'-5, Yugoslav, Czechoslovak and Democratic German literature 
either in general, or in a form where the state is the owner of the enterprise and 
the enterprise that of the assets in its possession.
In our opinion the concept of “divided ownership” ignores the essence, i. e. 
that a state enterprise unites the property of the state, in the first place its 
means of production, with work, with the group doing work. This is by no 
means some sort of abstract theory. The theory relies on the fact that in all 
vital questions the state lias reserved its authority (section 9). Ownership is 
vested exclusively in the state. However extensive the rights of the enterprise 
are, they are not of a proprietary nature. As opposed to the Yugoslav system, in 
Hungary ownership becomes united with a non-owner collective within the 
framework of the enterprise (section 6).
16. As regards the general concept of divided ownership, here the state 
figures so to say as “principal owner” of the assets, whereas the enterprise is
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some sort of “sub-ownwer”. This is valid equally for the starting assets given by 
the state, and for the portion of the profit earned in the course of enterprisal 
operations, and remaining with the enterprise. The doctrine of “divided owner­
ship“ recalls feudal conditions, still this alone would not defeat the theory. I t  is 
Tőkei who calls attention to the fact that — even if this may sound paradoxi­
cal — from an exploration of the Middle Ages a positive lesson might be drawn 
for communism.28 Eventually the doctrine of divided property was modernized 
by English law, when the institution of the trust was applied to modern condi­
tions to an ever expanding extent merely to circumvent some rigid theses of 
common law (e. g. to circumvent contract-law prohibitions by the institution 
of property law of fiduciary and beneficiary ownership), and this institution 
of trust, as a notion familiar in English legal thinking, is often quoted as an 
example when it is intended to approximate the relation between the socialist 
state and its enterprise to a Common Lawyer. Hence the problem cannot be 
solved merely by presenting the pedigree of “divided property”. In fact the 
problem has to be explox-ed on its merits. The basic objection which may be 
advanced is that the enterprise couples state property to a producing group. 
In the general notion of divided property
a)  the enterprise is considered some of “sub-proprietor” and by this
b) a position is qualified as quasi proprietorship which Hungarian legal 
thinking prefers to qualify as a position resulting from the independent partial 
rights of ownership: i. e. on this understanding enterprisal independence pre­
sents resemblance to usufruct;
c) consequently, two types of ownership have been introduced, and by 
this the notion of ownership has been blurred. We could hardly profit by using 
the same term to denote two different phenomena. This will hold in particular 
when it is a question of ownership whose basic and primary character goes back 
to the roots of the relations between economy and law. I t  would hardly be 
justifiable to question the validity of this thesis merely by considering the 
competence of the enterprise being of a proprietary nature within the frame­
work of divided property. Nor could one argue in favour of the general notion 
of divided property by emphasizing that the case is one of the two aspects of 
one and the same phenomenon, and not one of a connotation of two diverg­
ent phenomena. Although the two aspects, state and enterprisal, of the same 
phenomenon exist, only the basic and primary aspect is of a proprietary kind. 
And this aspect is that of the state, as enterprisal financial independence derives 
from the state and exists by the authority of the state. Here it may be argued 
that all rights are derived from the state. Apart from the inaccuracy of a state­
ment like this, there is an essential difference as concernes the problem dis­
cussed here, namely whether the rights are derived from the legislative power 
of the state as holder of sovereignty, or from the proprietary powers of the 
state as owner. As a matter of fact, enterprisal rights must be derived from 
the proprietary power of the state, even when the relations of state and enter­
prise manifest themselves in the form of administrative law and call for special 
legislation. All this seems to indicate that reality will find a better expression 
when the economic and legal position of the state is represented by an indepen­
dent non-proprietary category rather than by giving a relative trait to the no­
tion of property and in particular of ownership.
4  ANNALES — Sectio Iurid ica  — Tom us X II .
S T A T E  P R O P E R T Y  — S T A T E  E N T E R P R IS E  4 9
If  the general notion of divided property is pushed through consistently, 
then it will be found that division is not restricted to the relations of state and 
enterprise. As has been mentioned, part of the profits remaining at the enter­
prise will become partially “enterprisal”, partially collective-owned (or, simply, 
allocated to the development and the profit share funds). Thus, within the 
enterprise, divided property will come into being, i. e. property divided between 
the “enterprise” and the collective. In this separation the enterprise will either 
become a blank framework, or the state has to be visualized in the background. 
The former is absurd, because a blank framework cannot appropriate anything. 
In the latter instance, on the one part the state appropriates in a way that it is 
behind the “enterprise”; on the other, that the enterprise pays taxes to the 
state. I. e. within “sub-ownership”, too, partly the “principal owner” will 
emerge in addition to the employed “sub-owners”. These are muddled and 
puzzling results. They cannot be avoided unless the enterprise is considered 
homogeneous and the relative segregation of the “enterprisal”, “financial” and 
“business” elements from the working group is ignored. However, this would 
hardly be correct. It is the inherent vice of the formula “■principal property” of 
the state — enterprisal “sub-property” , and so also of the doctrine of enterprisal 
“commodity property” , that it aligns the state with the enterprise, and not property 
with work. I t  regards the enterprise combining property with work as 
homogeneous, although it is merely unified, but not homogeneous, viz. the 
financial and business aspects originating from ownership constitute a unity 
with the collective element coming forth from work in a relatively segregated 
manner.
As regards appropriation, in our opinion the peculiar situation will become 
true where the proprietary appropriator is the “party” which appears to approp­
riate in the least proprietary manner, i. e. the state, to which its own enter­
prises pay taxes. However, this is merely a legal form, which is justified by 
considerations of economic policy outside the scope of state ownership, viz. a 
policy which makes it clear that regulation, incentive, “dissuasion” may be 
made more convenient by the assessment of taxes rather than by means of 
an undifferentiated mass of profits. Itwould be mere legal formalism to draw the 
conclusion as if the state were appropriating as the holder of the sovereign 
power rather than in its capacity of an owner. One of the functions of the so­
vereign power is to provide for a coverage of the “joint costs” so well known 
from the criticism of the Gotha programme. Naturally, the taxes assessed on the 
enterprises eventually serve this end, still the same end would also be served 
by a direct appropriation of the profits.
In point of fact, the case here is that appropriation is arranged exclusi­
vely by the state as owner, which alone decides which part of profits shall be­
long to itself, which shall be allotted to the development, resp. reserve fund and 
which to the profit share fund. Thus the power to appropriate is exclusi­
vely vested in the state as owner. As to the assets remitted to the enterprisal 
development fund and to the reserve fund, these are appropriated by the state 
as owner through the link of the enterprise27, these assets are “secondary” state 
property, i. e. they are state property and not “sub-property“ within the fra­
mework of some sort of a divided property. The collective does not appropriate 
in a capacity of an owner either. The group, also through the will of the prop­
rietor state, appropriates as a non-proprietary working group, and, as will be
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made clear subsequently, within the limits of a wage system charcateristic 
of employment (section 26).
Hence, along the entire line, the 'proprietary appropriator is the slate2S, in 
the same way as the “enterprisal” and group rights are derived from the proprie­
tary power of the state.
17. The construction as if the enterprise were in the owners hip of the state 
and the assets in the ownership of the enterprise, sounds somewhat fascinating. 
Just as in the variant of divided property the feudal analogy loomed up, here 
the bourgeois analogy appears to be obvious. I. e. the enterprise-founding 
capitalists create a juristic person and endow' it with proprietary capacity. Why 
could not the socialist state act in the same way ?
Let us discuss the question the other way round. Why does the capitalist 
act as he does ? In our opinion, where the capitalist acts as he does, i. e. where 
he does not want to become identified with the enterprise, like in a joint stock 
company, he does so because he has the liquidity of his property in mind, he 
wants to segregate the part of liis property exposed to business risks completely, 
and often he wants to remain anonymous. But this is not the aim of the 
socialist state29 and if the state as owner is not liable for the debts of the enter­
prise, at least at home, this is not because the state, in fear of excessive risks, 
insists on limitations, but merely because this method is compatible with the 
independence of the enterprise.
And why is it not correct when the socialist state acts in this manner ? 
Beyond the basic argument quoted before, this is so because a state enterprise 
is not a bourgeois enterprise, whre the personnel is attached to the enterprise 
under a commodity contract, i. e. where the labour element is not an integral 
part of the enterprise. However, in a socialist enterprise the group collective is 
an integral part of the enterprise, even when a relative separation of the “enter- 
prisai” and personal aspects has been carried through. Vildghy has remarked 
appropriately that the personal side of the state enterprise, i. e. the group col­
lective, could hardly become an object of ownership30.
18. The next question to answer is how the ownership position will change 
in the event of partnership. If partnership takes place without the creation of a 
juristic person, no special problem will emerge, as the assets remain in the 
ownership of the partner enterprises. The analysis will be confined to the case 
when the partnership so created has been endowed with legal personality.
If we wanted to remain true to what has been set forth so far, we should 
come to conclusions hardly other than those holding for state enterprises. 
When, in the case of these, the state has proved to be the proprietary appropria­
tor, in the form of its profit share or taxes, or else through the link of the enter­
prise, then here, too, the situation will be the same, only by one link more. The 
assets of the company are state property of the third order, i. e. twice-transmit­
ted state property, whereas the competence of the company is one derived 
secondarily from the proprietary power of the state. This follows from the fact 
that the state as owner authorizes its enterprises to bring about partnerships, 
after the state has largely waived its right as the owner to organize the con­
centration or integration of its enterprises.
19. There is an undeniable complexity in this reasoning defeating the 
concept of divided property, although partnership would not put the partisans 
of the general variant of divided property in an easy position either. In any case it
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is easier to speak only of property in common parlance, in the same way as many 
telephones are labelled “Post Property”. However, although in common par­
lance nobody would insist on juristic accuracy, common parlance would relieve 
nobody of the requirement of legal accuracy. We are convinced that it is not 
the reasoning that is complex; what is complex is the highly developed socialist 
economy, and if the conclusions are fraught with complexities, it is because 
reality has made them complex.
V
The labour element
20. In the state enterprise the means of production in state ownership are 
combined with the groups doing work. Method and nature of this combination 
are characteristic of the transient phase of a socialist society, i. e. of the “not 
yet” and “no more” of what we may read in the “Critique of the Gotha Prog­
ramme”. The combination of property and work does no more take place 
through the agency of commodity relations, but there is not yet coincidence 
without some mediation. There is need for some agency, but this has ceased to 
be of a commodity nature. The man doing the work is no more in a class anta­
gonism to the owners, still in his present capacity he is not yet owner. The 
members of the working collective are as citizens, i. e. under the Constitution, 
joint owners of that all-social property which in the legal system appears as 
the property of the state representing society. In this sense, the bourgeois- 
citoyen separation will for the socialist phase be preserved while abolished. 
I t  will bo abolished while preserved because the bourgeois element has ceased 
to exist and has, in this context, been replaced by the consumer, the owner of 
personal property and it will be preserved while abolished because the relative 
separation of the status of a citizen and any other (worker and consumer) 
status still continues owing to the transient character of the socialist 
society. But continues in a way that, in the long run,even these rem­
nants of the bourgeois-citoyen duality will be broken up for good. Namely 
the liquidation of private property has created the fundamental condi­
tion for the enterprise as the collective of workers to form a uniform collec­
tive. The group emerging in this way is not of the “citoyen” type, because it 
is not all-social and has no public power; on the other hand this collective does 
not congregate the workers as consuming private persons through the medi­
ation of personal property, and this is exactly what is left over in the course 
of the preservation of the bourgeois character while terminating it. In the cou­
se of a dissolution of the citoyen-bourgeois duality society has inserted- 
between the status of a citizen and a consumer, through the status of a wor­
ker, the group collective occupying a position between the social all-collective 
and the individual, as one of the principal means of this liquidation; and so 
the citoyen-bourgeois separation has been superseded by the triple unity of 
citizen-worker-consumer, or of the member of the all-collective, the group mem­
ber, and the relatively autonomous person. This still existing relative separa­
tion is being dissolved by the wellknown thesis of Lenin, according to which
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even in the sphere of “private law” all is of “public law”31. I t  is also being 
dissolved by the social services in the sphere of which the consumer is not 
separated from the citizen, can be dissolved by communist consciousness 
which regards the elements of citizen, worker and consumer, the rights and 
obligations, as a unity. Socialism has so to say “encircled” this separation, 
but at the present stage of production it can be made disappear only in words, 
if at all.
In tliis question we therefore disagree with Weltner who otherwise has 
done pioneering work in the scientific construction and development of the 
law of the enterprisal collective. According to him, the workers take part 
as joint owners in the enterprisal operations, not as the joint owners of hypot­
hetical enterprisal property, but as the members of the whole of society 
working in a definite enterprise32. However, the members of the enter­
prisal collective take part in the work of the enterprise as workers, and not as 
citizens. The right to work is duo to them in their status as citizens33, but their 
proprietary relation to the enterprisal assets is the same as to the assets of 
other enterprises, or as the relations of others to their enterprise. Their financial 
interest does not follow from their all-social proprietary status, but from their 
“membership” in the enterprise; and their right of participation also has its 
origin in this “membership” and not in their all-social proprietary status. This is 
revealed also by the activities aimed at the safe-guard of the interests of the 
workers and by the fact that mostly the trade union is in charge of the rep­
resentation of the workers. This activity and its organization, is typically 
• non-proprietary in its character. The enterprisal collective is not a proprietary 
collective, it is only a working collective. In a state enterprise state ownership 
combines with the working collective. The theory of “divided property” ignores 
this fact from the proprietary aspect, and so does this “partial-proprietary” con­
cept from the aspect of the working collective; it blurs the distinction between tin 
two aspects of property and work, still relatively separated on an enterprisal (and 
not citizen) level. In this sphere the decisive new trait lies in the fact that in their 
status as citizens the workers are already joint owners, while in their capacity as 
workers they are not yet. This is a question of two different levels. The workers 
as citizens are entitled to the right to work, they have a share in the socialist 
democracy as achieved at the given stage of economic development, and of level 
of consciousness, and within the framework of tliis democracy, the woi'kers are 
entitled to make use of the potentialities of democracy also at the place of em­
ployment. However, these civic rights prevail in the various manifestations of 
social life in conformity with the specific regularities of the various partial 
fields, i. e. within the enterprise as the rights of the nonproprietary working 
collective, and not directly as a partial proprietary right of the citizen. I t can be 
explained only in this way why the workers of a given enterprise have more rights 
in the section of state property that has been turned into the assets of this enter­
prise, than extra-enterprisal persons, employees, co-operative members, de­
pendants, etc. who equally are subjects of all-social property.
21. In the last analysis, the contradiction of labour law, or its duality, viz. 
that the workers are attached to the enterprise by a bi-personal legal relation 
of the labour contract, and that, on the other hand, the workers constitute a 
collective as concerns the interest-structure and spheres of authority, follows 
from the relics of the separation “bourgeois-citoyen”. The two-position relation
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and the collective relation are in peaceful co-existence as two clearly sepa­
rated bodies. This separation of the bi-personal legal relation from the col­
lective relation is a phenomenon of the period of transition. Regarded from 
this angle, the bi-personal legal relation is the bourgeois labour law relation 
void of class antagonism and commodity relation (although commodity pro­
duction and other factors have an appreciable influence on this non-commodity 
type relation), whereas the collective relation is communist labour relation void 
of the majority of the marks characteristic of a communist society. For that 
matter this duality is shown also by the principle of the reform of economic 
management that in matters affecting the collective, action should be taken 
in agreement with the trade union, and that in matters affecting single persons 
the one-man leadership of the manager (director) will prevail.34
22. Hence the enterprisal working collective should be considered a non­
proprietary group attached to the enterprise by a set of bilateral contracts. 
The employees attached to the enterprise by such bi-personal legal relations are 
turned into a group chiefly by their joint non-proprietary financial interest. 
Here, too, interest will lay claim to rights, namely the group possesses certain 
non-proprietary rights, and in order that it might exercise these rights as a group 
the members of the group have non-proprietary membership rights and obliga­
tions. I t  is outside the scope of the present paper to point out that in addition to 
the economic and legal aspect there is also a social-political, educative aspect, 
in the long run the most important, namely the efforts displayed for the de­
velopment of a “true community” (Gemeinwesen), whose success largely de­
pends on the totality of the economic and mental evolution.
23. In the term “joint non-proprietary financial interest” the expression 
“non-proprietary” betrays that here the question is one of employees and not 
of joint owners, and the expression “joint interest” that the particular members 
of the group are directly interested in the results of the group as a whole. This 
system of interest has been completed on an enterprisal level. However, there 
still remains the effective completion of the internal (factory unit, shop, working 
site, etc.) system of interest35, since the more directly group interest is coupled 
to individual interests, the more efficient is the system. Large-scale enterprises, 
so frequent under developed industrial conditions, are incomprehensible for the 
particular worker. It will become an abstract entity, so that further mediators 
are needed in the course of the conciliation of all-social and individual interests.
24. Obviously group rights are directed outwards. However, these are 
specific “external” relations, because they do not extend beyond the scope 
of the enterprise. The “external” relations attach the collective to the “enter­
prise“, i. e. legal relations come into being between the enterprise and its perso­
nal side. In reality these legal relations are established between the proprietary 
and the personal sides, on the basis of a community of interest of the two sides, 
and as determined by the divergence of interests characteristic of them. For 
that matter, this seems to defeat the „part-proprietary” quality of the collective 
members as workers. This divergence of interests has its origins not in the segre­
gation of the development and profit share funds, still it shows in relief this 
segregation, so to say personifies this divergence of interests, at the same 
time when state-proprietary segregation and obligator}' distribution reduce 
the sphere of the clashes of interests by fixing in advance the ratio by which 
any residual profits should be distributed between the two sides. As a matter of
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fact the harmony of interests mentioned above may be explained by the fact 
that when the enterprisal assets are larger, both sides may have their respective 
shares increased. On the other hand the divergence, moreover clash of interests, 
will in this sphere manifest itself in the distribution between the two sides in 
the first place. This divergence or clash of interests may, however, be mitigated 
by the state-proprietary distribution already mentioned. Still in the course of 
the evolution of the reform the clashes of interests may tend to rise, and the 
development of the system of interestedness may be responsible for trends in 
the management of the enterprise which may justifiably prompt the collective 
to take a resolute stand. Hence the conflict of property and work will be preser­
ved white abolished in the same way as the method of the combination of pro­
perty with work (section 20). The element of abolition applies to the conflicts 
manifesting themselves in class antagonism; the conflict, as the conflict of 
interests arising on the soil of the identity of all-social and group interests will 
from the one side appear as the conflict of production and the satisfaction of 
social needs, from the other as that of the satisfaction of group needs. In the 
conflict the enterprise will be divided into a proprietary-all-social and a wor­
ker-group side. Furthermore the element of “abolition” manifests itself in the 
circumstance that the legal relations of “enterprise” and group are by far not 
exclusively conflict relations. On the soil of the harmony of interests these 
relations are at the same time predominantly those of mutual aid and co-ope­
ration. This will become particularly clear in the suggestions of the collective 
for an improvement or rationalization of production. The criticising activity 
of the collective might be a manifestation of co-operation as well as of conflict. 
Although there may be a potential or open conflict in the background of repre­
sentative activities aimed at the safeguard of labour interests, still the case is 
rather one of the conciliation of relatively divergent points of view, where the 
best possible solution will be the one which by inspiring the collective with satis­
faction also redounds to the benefit of the “enterprisal” side.
In fact, and in the first place, these intra-enterprisal “external” legal rela­
tions of the collective represent the collective’s rights in the management of 
enterprisal affairs, in decision-making. Naturally, in a most favourable case, 
extensive authority should be assigned to the collective in this sphere. Such a 
policy would be of utmost importance in an effort to create a “true community” 
because without a proper sjihere of authority, the system of interests can per­
form the function of incentive only partially, and because for a completion of the 
group structure a personal participation in management is indispensable. 
However, a condition of the achievement of this goal is that the collective 
should be a proprietary collective. Still this is not the only problem, as in fact, 
in the actual proprietary collectives (in cooperatives), the personal participa­
tion of the members in decision-making is not always sufficiently intensive 
either. The fact that in state enterprises the state-employed manager is the 
one-man leader in conformity with state ownership, is not the only obstacle 
on the path to full participation. Reasons lying much deeper are involved here, 
and also these may be traced back to the transient character of socialist soci­
ety. For the time being the gap between the stock of knowledge, horizon and 
range of interest essential for far-reaching decisions and the state of consciousness 
of important layers of the labour force performing often mechanical, monotonous, 
physi cally exhausting work is still too great. This leads to the fact that the mem-
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bers of the collective can in most cases take the initiative with success only in 
connexion with decisions affecting their immediate environment. Beyond 
this, however, the participation of the collective is subject to a dual limita­
tion, viz.:
a) In the matters concerning the whole enterprise, the collective takes 
part through its representative, i. e. the trade union committee, mutatis mutan­
dis, in the same way as the exercise of all-social ownership rights also takes 
place through a representative, i. e. the state. The trade union committee is the 
partner of the manager representing the proprietary-all-social side, i. e. the “en- 
terprisal”, “business” side. In this respect the optimum to be achieved is that the 
trade union properly informs the collective, and is at the same time kept ade­
quately advised of the developments at the enterprise. Hence the above men­
tioned „membership” rights and obligations the working collective come for­
ward mostly within the ti’ade union.
b) The second limitation follows mostly from state ownership. Through 
the trade union, the collective influences decision-making in business matters 
through its activities aimed at the safeguard of labour interests (e. g. action in 
the event of large-scale dismissals, labour safety competences) rather than ta ­
king part in it. This relative segregation of the “business” and “safeguarding” 
activities also reflects the relative separation of ownership and the group doing 
the work.
Nevertheless an extremely important activity will be left to the members 
of the collective, an activity to which a well established system of interests 
supplies the fuel and which does not insist on an institutionalized, organiza­
tional, decision-making and representative system, namely is criticism. Hence 
from “above” the channelling and influencing role of state socialist ownership 
and the indirect economic regulators of the state wielding the sovei’eign power 
put a check on the extreme freedom of enterprisal decision-making and from the 
“inside”, ideas are supplied and limitations are imposed by the criticism of 
the group collective nurtured by the interest of this collective.36
25. When the group has “external” legal relations of its own, then it is a 
subject at law.31 This quality of being a subject at law is one of labour law and 
not of civil law. This means that the group is “a subject at law of a collective 
character besides man, the state, and the juristic person“.38 The latter three are 
of the civil law, the first of the labour law type. This subject at law of a labour 
law character is segregated from the subjects at law of a civil law character not 
because it is a collective type, — in fact, a juristic person is also of the collective 
type, — but, as made clear by Weltner, by the fact that the group is an 
intra-enterprisal subject at law. Its function is to become one of the ele­
ments of a group structure, i. e. to personify legally the labour side of the pro­
perty-work merger, and not to take part in relations of a relatively autonomous 
structure, like a subject at civil law.
Parallel to what has been set forth above, the enterprise’s status of a 
subject at labour law will also be enriched. In accordance with the contradic­
tion referred to in Section 21, the enterprise is the subject of partly individu­
al, bi-personal labour law relations, partly of legal relations where the other 
party is the group collective. In both legal relations, the enterprise is a subject 
at labour law, the embodiment of the proprietary side.
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As we have seen, the collective as a subject a t labour law is represented 
mostly by the trade union committee, like the enterprise as the subject at 
labour law by the manager. Enterprisal management and the trade union are 
mutually “social partners of equal rank, not in the control of the process of 
production, but in the representation of the interests of the workers“39. In this 
way, a representative will come into prominence on both sides who is at the same 
time identical with the side represented by him and also different from it. As 
will be explained (section 27) the manager is attached to the proprietor state 
by employment, and to the enterprise by his interests for the most part. The 
trade union committee represents the group performing work, which, however, 
is not identical with the primary trade union organization. The members of the 
work-performing group are not automatically trade union members. They 
become members only by voluntarily joining the trade union. The primary 
trade union organization, like the enterprise itself, is not only a subject at 
labour law, but also a subject at civil law. The same cannot be said of the group 
collective. Finally, the trade union committee, like the manager, has supra- 
enterprisal relations outside the group, which attach the committee to central, 
superior trade union organs.
This peculiar position of the representatives of the two sides, i. e. to some 
extent their separation from those whom they represent, and their relations to 
superior organs, clearly demonstrates again that within a state enterprise state ow­
nership is coupled with the group performing the work. Although the existence of 
relations with superior bodies always implies the risk that matters will be settled 
not within the enterprise, but above it, i. e. a scope will be opened to bureau­
cratic methods, still in the present system there is always a chance of reconci­
ling proprietary-business interests and the standpoint of the representation of 
the working group on the upper and mid-level at the very outset, i. e. of referr­
ing certain conflicts, which may defy attempts at a solution within the enter­
prise, to the superior quarters of the two sides. This may have repercussions also 
on the contradiction e. g. of the bi-personal employment and the group collec­
tive in a way that the contradiction will be mitigated somewhat when statutory 
provisions and agreements by collective bargaining brought into harmony by 
the two sides prevent bi-personal labour law relations from being atomized, and 
shape them so as to conform to the needs of the group.
Hence the collective as a subject at law, and its representation, the element 
of interest protection first of all, betrays the existence of a non-proprietary ¡la­
bour group, further that the enterprise consisting of the same group is not owner 
either, and enforces the proprietary elements of the state merely through the agency 
of its manager having a peculiar position in this co-operation for common inte­
rests, yet also fraught with conflicts of interests of which the combination of pro­
perty and enterprisal work consists.
26. So far the group has been considered a mostly homogeneous unit. 
However, within the group there is a division of labour which is relevant for 
the topic of the present study. As a matter of fact, a distinction has to be made 
between the members of the group having an influence on the enterprise as a 
whole, and the others. In fact the interests of the owner are served, or may be 
brought to naught, by the former to a much greater extent than by the latter. 
The excellent execution of a wrong enterprisal decision might become respon­
sible for the accumulation of unsaleable stocks. On the other hand, a correct
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decision will make realizable the results of the work of the collective to the 
benefit of the national economy and the enterprise. The Hungarian system of 
economic management has drawn the necessary conclusions in so far as it has 
approached the wages and salaries of such collective members to those of the 
proprietary type interest. Wages and salaries of those coming within this 
sphere
a) depend to a greater extent on the profits earned than those of other 
employees; and
b) in the event of a loss a definite portion of such wages and salaries will 
have to be returned.
Here several elements combine, viz.
a) firstly, that it follow's from the principle of the socialist wage-system 
that those of the decision-making group should be paid higher wages and sala­
ries;
b) secondly, that it is a manifestation of the collective interest of the wor­
king group that the wages of those of the decision-making group depend to a 
higher extent on the profits than those of the others;
c) thirdly, the fact that those of the decision-making group have to bear 
the loss to a definite degree, seems to be a proprietary-entrepreneurial solution. 
In a structure where property and work are separated from each other, the work 
side cannot bear the loss; at most it can run the risk of looking for another job 
in the event of the bankruptcy of the enterprise. The loss must be charged to the 
owner, and never to non-proprietary work linked up with him. On the side of 
work the wages and salaries of individual work performed have to be guaranteed. 
Hence the method of a partial defrayal of the loss integrates a proprietary ele­
ment within the wage system of those concerned. However, by this the state does 
not make the workers in executive positions joint owners, but as the owner 
establishes the wage system derived from employment so as to integrate a 
risk-bearing element with it to a definite extent. The employee will remain em­
ployee, still a definite portion of his salary can move not only upwards but also 
downwards: it is part and parcel of the coverage of the proprietary risk. This 
position of the persons concerned does not follow from their general capacity 
of joint owners of all-social property, but may be traced back to the nature of 
their assignment, to their position occupied in the division of labour within the 
enterprise. As for its purpose, the obligation of a partial restitution of the loss 
is homogeneous with all that has the character of an incentive in the wage 
system, i. e. on the level of individuals with efficiency rating and on the level 
of the collective with the profit share; however, in the service of the end as for 
its content it goes beyond the range of employment and wage systems. In fact, 
it passes the boundaries of the proprietary-entrepreneurial range to an extent 
limited in advance. This amounts to a limited proprietary liability, however, 
beyond this rather generalized statement, it differs in every other respect e. g. 
from the limited liability of the shareholder. The legal environment of the 
fundamental discrepancies is the fact that this proprietary limited liability is 
integrated into the wage system of the employees concerned in the form of a reduc­
tion, or restitution, of part of the salary or wage in an obligatory form. This is a 
case of an incentive surplus, and not of those concerned being turned into joint 
owners with the state in a definite proportion.
5 8  G Y . E O R S I
27. However, among those concerned there is a person endowed with a 
special legal status, namely the manager, who is an employee of the state, and 
not of the enterprise. Therefore, legally, he is not member of the enterprisal 
collective. Nyers calls him the delegate of the state, i. e. of the owner: he is the 
man of the state in the enterprise'11; as we have seen in the co-operation with 
the group and in the disputes, he acts for the “enterprisal”, i. e. “business” side. 
In the system of one-man management, it appears as if the owner state had 
unrestricted command over the enterprise, i. e. in this respect it was in vain to 
endow the enterprise with a high degree of independence. In fact it is a state 
employee, the manager who may avail himself of the benefits of this indepen­
dence without initiating others into decision-making. I t appears as if enterprisal 
independence were but a decentralization of governmental decisions by ves­
ting decision-making in the enterprisal lieutenant of the state.
Still this would be a rather one-sided representation of the facts. Literary 
history is acquainted with the notion of the “hero of dual allegiance”. A person 
of this type is the manager. Employment ties him to the state, whereas his 
interest attaches him mostly to the enterprise. In this sense the manager, too, 
is a member of the enterprisal collective. One may say that the manager while 
doing work depends on the owner; as the personal owner, however, apart from 
the possibility of dismissal, he is in a system of interest in conjunction with 
the working collective. If he wants to satisfy both the state and the collec­
tive and to increase his income, then he has to reconcile all-social and group in­
terests. I f  in a given matter this is not feasible, then he has to find the best 
possible expedient. Hence this dual allegiance for the reconciliation of the group 
interests and all-social interests, by connecting the manager to the state under 
labour law. This solution will stand the test when basically there is in reality a 
harmony between the group interest and that of national economy, when even­
tual conflicts can be settled mostly in a satisfactory manner.
This dual allegiance of the manager is strengthened by the fact that, 
although he is the trustee of the state, the principal, i. e. the employer cannot 
instruct him to take definite measures. An argumentation that although under 
administrative law the state cannot issue instructions to the enterprise, still 
under labour law the state could instruct the manager, would be rather bizarre. 
The state endows its trustee with complete independence, it reinforces his fi­
nancial interest in that it helps the enterprise where he is trustee to operate with 
profits, and, apart from a few flagrant cases, appraises him by the results of his 
entire work.
I t is a modern method of organizing the management of the objects of state 
ownership, rather than a solution of the problem of “divided property”, when 
the state appoints the manager, and grants him a free scope for operations. In 
fact the manager is the chief executive of the enterprise in the socialist meaning. 
It has already been made clear that this is a case of the socialist manifestation 
of the phenomenon of modern large-scale industry. Under modern economic 
conditions the management of an enterprise does not only require professional 
erudition, but also special accomplishments in the field of organization, leader­
ship, information, etc. I t  is the consequence of this, and also of other factors, 
th a t the owner by preserving his power, by changing the means of the exercise 
of authority, withdraws behind the scenes, and entrusts another person with 
the management of the enterprise. The owner sets the targets to this person,
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defines the system of interest, and gives him freedom of action. The owner- 
will dismiss him if he is disappointed with him.
Hence the manager is a connecting link between the owner state and the 
working collective. He depends on both, not necessarily in the legal sense, and, 
influenced by such a doubly motivated structure, exercises the rights originat­
ing from enterprisal independence in a system of one-man management.
VI
Conclusions
28. State socialist ownership is a category of ownership from which in 
the status of a citoyen nobody is barred, still in any other capacity everybody 
is excluded, this, too, is a manifestation of the often mentioned transient char­
acter of a socialist society: the fact of being barred is an indication of the 
origin of this society, whereas the participation in this ownership points 
at the goal towards which it is tending.
Consequently, on the citizen side the structure of this ownership is absolute 
in a sense that nobody is outside the walls of this right. In any other respect, 
ownership is absolute in the conventional meaning. In principle, and in an ab­
stract form, the same may be said of its negative character, i. e. on the citizen si­
de this negative character is always absent, because in joint ownership the active 
protection of ownership at least against the other joint owners is the duty of 
every owner, whereas in every other respect the negative character will be 
there. Since, however, in judging the unlawful and imputable attitude of a given 
person, the citizen, the worker and the private person satistying his needs can­
not be kept apart, and because from § 4 of the Civil Code a civil law obligation 
of activity may be inferred in general in respect of all absolute and relative 
legal relations, the statement may be made that the negative character of 
state ownership is at best but a half truth.
29. A further characteristic of state socialist ownership is that this owner­
ship is not exclusively a civil law institution. Fundamentally, this is the conse­
quence of the intertwining of the sovereign and proprietary capacity as analyzed 
by Venediktov. This ownership
a) is on an all-social level, mostly in the vertical sense, an institution of 
public, administrative and fiscal law;
b) on the level of the group collective, in internal relations, an institution 
of labour law;
c) on the level of autonomous structures, in horizontal relations, an in­
stitution of civil law.
30. On an all-social level
a) state socialist ownership is first of all the relation of the owner citizens 
to the state representing them in a proprietary capacity. In the first place this is 
t he peculiarity of state ownership under public law.
b) As far administrative law is concerned, the greatest significance con­
sists in the creation of state enterprises, in the establishment of the ope­
rating conditions and control of the enterprise. This sphere includes not 
only the formation of the enterprise, its reorganization, termination, the setting
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of targets, the floating of the starting capital, rehabilitation and liquidation, 
but also the prohibition on instructions and on the reshuffle of assets. In the 
earlier system of economic management this right was called the proprietary 
managerial right. At that time the designation was appropriate, today it has 
ceased to be so: the state does not manage its enterprises anymore, as these 
have been endowed not only with executive, but also with decision-making 
functions.42 For want of a more appropriate term this right is called the right of 
keeping in operation enterprises.
c) Fiscal law in the present acceptation includes the rights granted by 
the budget, further, in the sphere of taxation, the institution of a profit tax, 
by which the state collects the profit for the reasons already mentioned.
d) In the employment of the manager labour law has a function on an 
all-social level.
31. The economic activities for which enterprises are created take place in 
the group relations. These include
a)  the organizational relations and those of interest on the “enterprisai” 
side and the legal relations associated with them;
b)  the same elements on the side of those performing work;
c) bi-personal employment.
Of these b) and c) come within the scope of labour law, whereas the posi­
tion of a) in the legal system is still unsettled. The reasons of this unsettled 
character may be traced back to the earlier system of economic management, viz. 
a state enterprise was considered an agency of state economic administration 
in a sense that, notwithstanding the character of the enterprise of an indepen­
dent subject at civil law, the shaping of its internal organization appeared to 
be an activity within the scope of administrative law. This activity was promot­
ed also by the uniformity of the organization decreed from above. However, 
this situation was ever more obviously in conflict with the civil law character 
of the enterprise, the evolution of the system of independent accounting and 
the right of operative management. At the same time there is no doubt that the 
shaping of the internal enterprisal organization, the definition of the range of 
interest, the marking out of the internal competences are by no means matters 
of civil law, i. e. these are not relations of the autonomous structure, and are 
not even commodity relations. Civil law is interested in these internal rela­
tions only in so far as for the external relations the conditions of enterprisal 
existence have to be present, further the persons qualified for decision-making 
and for declarations must be known.
As regards the various types of co-operatives, it seems that some sort of a 
consolidated co-operative law is beginning to take shape43. This law would be a 
branch of owner and, at the same time, working group law and would basically 
extend to the internal and representative aspects of such relations. On the side 
of state enterprises only the side doing the work belongs to the sphere of a 
branch of law, viz. labour law, whereas the expansion of the proprietary side to 
the inside of the enterprise does not. It is true, though, that the character of a 
legal branch dealing with the totality of the internal legal relations of a group is 
much more obvious if in the group the proprietary and working capacities 
unite, than if the two are only linked up without becoming one. However, 
within the enterprise, too, there is only a single collective, even if it is a non­
proprietary one and the collective which is the carrier of the “enterprisal”,
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“economic” organization of the enterprise, its system of interests, legal rela­
tions, is the same as the subject of the organization, the interest, and the legal 
relations on the “work-performing” side. Therefore the solution suggests 
itself to have the internal relations of the enterprise embraced by a single branch 
of law, i. e. that labour law should extend also to the internal relations of the 
“enterprisal” side. By this the evolution extending the law of bi-personal em­
ployment to those of the working group collective would be completed. This 
would at the same time be also a step forward in the process of dissociation from 
the bourgeois forms. There labour law is restricted to the side of work, as there 
is the gap of class antagonism between property and work. As has already been 
made clear, although so far only class antagonism has been liquidated, the com­
plete union of property and work is still outstanding. But within the enterprise 
proper only division of labour differentiates, but not class antagonism. In the 
internal system of enterprisal interest, the community of interests of the pro­
prietary and the working sides is more intense than their conflict of interests. 
The owner, i. e. the state, in general refrains from interfering with the regulation 
of internal relations. I t is the enterprise, i. e. the collective that, so to say, takes 
decisions, headed by the manager owing dual allegiance. In such circumstances 
there is no obstacle whatever that labour law should, after the integration of 
the collective relations, do the same with the “enterprisal” side of collective 
activities, and extend to the entire internal and representative activities of the 
group.u
By this the legal relations of the working groups having such an outstan­
ding x'ole in the liquidation of the citoyen-bourgeois antithesis, in the reconcilia­
tion of individual and social interests, would fill two branches of law, viz. the 
relations of the proprietary and working groups would fill co-operative law, and 
the non-proprietary working group would fill labour law. This is justified by the 
peculiarities of the social relations and the legal methods which characterize 
the working group.45
32. The level of the autonomous structure, i. e. the horizontal relations, are 
marked commodity production first of all. Purchase of raw material, power, 
etc., the realization of profits on the market, transport, investment, granting 
of bank credits, are effected through commodity-type contrats. To these the 
contracts of partnership must be added where the commodity element may be 
rather intensive. Still it may occur that only the autonomous structure will 
preserve their memory. Technical development, which takes place through the 
mediation of partly commodity, partly non-commodity relations; protection of 
possession, or, in general, of the traditional partial rights of ownership, 
possession and the right of disposal, whereas under enterprisal conditions the 
right of use is a part of “labour law” in the wider meaning, discussed in the 
previous section, though not yet fully recognized, are in all events part of the 
internal enterprisal relations, and not of the horizontal relations.
33. Hence the state as owner exercises the traditional rights of the owner 
through either its sovereign and administrative agencies, or its enterprises. 
As owner, the state makes use of the means of both administrative and 
labour law. These means appear in a rather intensive form when budgetary 
agencies and institutions are concerned; on the other hand, in the sphere of 
administrative law, they are confined to “keeping in operation” in the meaning 
as before, and, in the sphere of labour law, to the manager and his deputy.
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34. The principal junction of a state enterprise is the combination of state 
socialist property with the non-proprietary working collective, for the satisfaction 
of solvent needs within the sphere of the scope set by the owner, i.e. the state.
As regards the enterprise, it is not owner, still has a high degree of financial 
independence; it has no ownership, still it possesses the right of independent ma­
nagement. The indirect economic regulators (and the labour contract of the ma­
nager with the state) are called to shape an economic environment where the 
decisions prompted by enterprisal interests in general also serve the enforce­
ment of all-social interest.
Still to this end the intensive development of the collective is required in a 
aence that it becomes the firm link of all-social and individual interests. The 
members of this collective are joint owners of the whole of state property as 
citizens-, but they are members of the enterprisal collective as workers, and their 
financial interests are rooted in their quality of personal owners and private 
consumers. This inseparable triple quality provides the possibilities for a re­
conciliation of interests as referred to before, in the same way as it is the basis 
of the triple structure of the legal relations, viz. of the all-social, group and rela­
tively autonomous structures.
35. This development of the collective serves also distant ends. The eco­
nomic and mental evolution reinforced during the successive phases and then 
transformed, will break up the principal social barrier in the way of the achieve­
ment of the “true community”, i. e. the segregation of the citizen and the perso­
nal owner in the present meaning of the term. Here is the seeming contradiction 
that the development of the working group collectives is a phenomenon contrary 
to the future end referred to above, i. e. taking place in the spirit of financial 
interest, and even in the sphere of the satisfaction of individual needs, the rein­
forcement of personal property has been made an objective rather than the 
increase of the ratio of social services. The principal object of the collective is 
just the development of intensive group interests which would be capable of 
mediating between the unfolded energy of personal property and the interests of 
national economy. Here again we have to do with the transient character of 
socialism, i. e. the future is being built up partly with the tools of the past. The 
fuel with which at the present stage of development the motor operates with the 
highest efficiency, i. e. particular financial interest, is beyond doubt not the 
fuel of communism, and in addition it is imbued with a concomitant risk of 
contamination threatening with a lasting harm to consciousness. Still the motor 
driven by this fuel draws towards the complete building up of socialism and 
the preparation of the transition to communism. The noxious by-effects of the 
fuel have to be neutralized, and meanwhile the historically new type of fuel, viz. 
consciousness and the sense of responsibility have to be brought into action 
more and more.
36. Hence, along the whole line, recourse will be had to the solution by 
which within the framework of the state enterprise
a) the state ownership of the means of production will be linked up 
with the
b) working non-proprietary group whose members in their status as 
citizens (and not of worker or personal proprietary capacity) are in the sense 
of public law joint owners of state property.
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This is the origin of the peculiarity of the state enterprise that here lines 
may be drawn separating on the one part the “enterprisal”, “economic” and 
“business” elements, which arise from the element of property, and on the other 
the „collective” element, which has its roots in the element of work. The two 
are linked up by the community of interests relying on the state ownership of 
the means of production, the system of regulators guaranteeing the harmony of 
social and enterprisal interests, further on the economic and legal position of 
the manager.
On the level of law, this combined units would perhaps be expressed best 
if the internal relations of the enterprise were consolidated in the rules of a 
single bianch of law. I his branch of law would be that of the non-proprietary 
working group and would contain
ci) the internal regulation applying to the enterprise as an economic unit;
b) the collective legal relations, including the safeguarding of interests;
c) the bi-personal labour law relations.
What has been set forth in the foregoing suggests tha t neither the enter­
prise as an economic unit, nor the working collective can be considered joint 
owners in the meaning of civil law. The widespread interests and the rights of 
both have their origin in the ownership of the state, and not directly in their own 
(joint) ownership, i. e. the enterprise as secondary association having legal 
personality husbands with tertiary state property. This is what under actual 
circumstances enterprisal financial independence, and the legal construction of 
the right of independent management, further the quality of the collective of a 
subject at labour law, express.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Im  R ahm en des staatlichen  U nternehm ens werden
a) das E igentum srech t des S taates über die P roduktionsm itte l und
b) eine arbeitausführende N ichteigentüm ergruppe m iteinander verbunden, deren Mitglieder 
in  ih rer E igenschaft als S taa tsbürger (nicht aber als W erktätige oder als persönliche E igentüm er) 
in  staatsrech tlichem  Sinn Teilinhaber des staatlichen  E igentum srechtes sind.
D araus fo lg t jene B esonderheit des staatlichen  U nternehm ens, w onach die aus dem E le ­
m en t des E igentum s stam m enden „U nternehm en-“ „W irtschafts-“ „G eschäftselem ente“ und 
das aus dem  A rbeitselem ent stam m ende „K ollek tiv“ -E lem ent zu unterscheiden sind. Die bei­
den sind durch  die au f  dem  S taatseigen tum  der P roduktionsm itte l beruhende Interessengem ein­
schaft, durch  das System  der ökonomischen H ebel zur Sicherung der Ü bereinstim m ung der ge­
sellschaftlichen und U nternehm ensinteressen, sowie durch die „zweifach gebundene“ w irtschaft­
liche u n d  rechtliche S tellung des D irektors verbunden.
Diese zusam m engesetzte E inheit könnte  au f  dem  Gebiet des R echtes am  besten dadurch 
ausgedrückt werden, wenn säm tliche innere V erhältnisse des U nternehm ens durch  die Regeln 
eines einzigen Rechtezweiges zusam m engefasst wären. Dieser Rechtszweig wäre der Rechtszweig 
der arbeitenden Nichteigentümergruppe und enthielte
a) die innere Regelung bezüglich des U nternehm ens als einer w irtschaftlichen E inheit,
b) die kollektiven R echtsverhältn isse, den In teressenschutz inbegriffen,
c) die A rbeitsrechtsverhältnisse zwischen zwei Personen.
Aus dem  G esagten geh t zugleich hervor, dass weder das U nternehm en als w irtschaftliche 
E inheit, noch das arbeitende K ollektiv  in zivilrechtlichem  Sinn n ich t einm al als Teileigentüm er 
zu betrach ten  sind. Ih re  ausgedehnte In teressierthe it und ihre R echte entspringen n ich t u n ­
m itte lb a r ihrem  eigenen (Teil-) E igentum srecht, sondern sind aus dem  E igentum srecht des 
S taates abgeleitet: das U nternehm en w irtschaftet m it einem  sekundären, die Vereinigung m it 
R echtspersönlichkeit m it einem  tertiä ren  /Staatseigentum. Das is t u n te r unseren derzeitigen 
V erhältnissen durch  die w irtschaftliche K onstruk tion  der Selbständigkeit des U ntem elim ens- 
' Vermögens und  durch  die juristische K onstruk tion  des selbständigen W irtsehaftungsrechtes,
sowie durch  die R echtspersönlichkeit des K ollektivs ausgedrückt.
РЕЗЮМЕ
В рамках государственного предприятия сочетаются:
а) право государственной собственности на средства производства и
б) не собственническая группа, которая исполняет работу и члены которых являют­
ся в качестве граждан (то есть ни как трудящиеся или личные собственники) частными 
собственниками права гражданской собственности в смысле гражданского права.
Из этого вытекает характерность государственного предприятия, что в нём раз­
личаются элементы „предприятия”, „хозяйства”, „торговли”, происходящие из элемента 
собственности и элемент „коллектива”, корень которого находится в элементе труда. 
Оба элемента сочетаются общностью интересов, основывающейся на государственной 
собственности средств производства, системой экономических регуляторов, направля- 
щейся на обеспечение согласовать интересы общества и предприятия, равно как и эко­
номическим и правовым статусом „двойной связанности” директора.
(ц; G Y . E O K S I
На уровне права это сложное единство нашло бы выражение в том, если бы все 
внутренние отношения предприятия были охвачены правилами одинаковой отрасли 
права. Эта отрасль права была бы отраслью права трудящейся группы, не являющейся 
собственником и она содержала бы
а) внутреннее урегулирование, касающееся предприятия как экономического един­
ства,
б) коллективные правовые отношения, включая защиту интересов,
в) двухличные отношения трудового права.
Из вышесказанных исходит и то, что ни предприятие, как экономическое единство, 
ни коллектив трудящихся нс может быть рассмотрено частным собственником в смысле 
гражданского права. Их распространенные заинтересованность и права не вытекают не­
посредственно из их (частного) права собственности,а из права государственной собствен­
ности: предприятие хозяйствует вторичной государственной собственностью, пока объеди­
нение, имеющее юридическое лицо, хозяйствует третичной государственной собствен­
ностью. Это выражается в  актуальных у с л о в и я х  экономической конструкцией имущест­
венной самостоятельности предприятия и юридической конструкцией самосоятельного 
хозяйственного парава.
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